

Suspensions in Kierkegaard and Husserl

Michael R. Michau

INTRODUCTION

Leon Shestov (1866-1938), a Russian-Jewish existentialist writer and one of Edmund Husserl's last associates, was not asked, but was demanded by the founder of modern phenomenology to become acquainted with the works of Søren Kierkegaard. Shestov comments, "Husserl...seems to have become acquainted with Kierkegaard... during the last years of his life. ...it seems clear that Kierkegaard's ideas deeply impressed him."¹ Why would the last bastion of European 'rationality' insist that one read the Lutheran Dane, who has been called an 'irrationalist,' whose quest is not for knowledge, but for self-education and faith? In this paper I will attempt to think through this question, and will do so by taking a philosophical perspective on the notion and activity of suspending commitments to various mundane goals evident in both thinkers' writings. Abraham's teleological suspension of the ethical – as recounted in Johannes de Silentio's *Fear and Trembling* and Johannes Climacus' *Concluding Unscientific Postscript to Philosophical Fragments* – and Edmund Husserl's suspension of the natural attitude in his phenomenology (focusing most closely on the his later works, the *Cartesian Meditations* and *Crisis of European Sciences*) will be observed in comparison to, and in convergence with, one another. Is Kierkegaard a proto-phenomenologist? Could one accurately pinpoint and describe his method of self-awareness and faith? Conversely, where is Husserl writing as an existential philosopher, advocating for self-discovery and individuality? I will argue that these are not completely different queries, but opposite sides of the same coin. Both wrote about the suspension as an active choice made in order to reach a higher level of humanity. Now, one may deeply criticize this attempted rereading of Kierkegaard through Husserl, or vice versa, calling me crazy or mad. Why read existentialism through phenomenology? What purpose is served here? "Perhaps," as Derrida hopes in "On Forgiveness," "this madness is not so mad" (60). I see, and will highlight in this paper, some profound intersections between Kierkegaard and Husserl that I feel deserve some exploration and interpretation.

For Kierkegaard, the teleological suspension of the ethical is the gateway to faith. The ethical-universal mode of existence is to be suspended in order to make room for authentic existence and faith. Silentio observes, "Faith is namely this paradox, that the single individual is higher than the universal" (*FT*, 55). Abraham became a knight of faith "by making a beginning" (*ibid*, 63). What he "began" was to see that the ethical-universal mode is not the final stage on life's way. For Husserl, the suspension of the natural attitude, or epoché, reveals the transcendental ego. Similar to Silentio's reading of Abraham's suspension as the way to faith, the naturalistic attitude is not the final stage on life's way. Phenomenology is a methodology that seeks radical beginnings for philosophy. The two suspensions are, in a manner of speaking, "new interiorities" that are "incommensurable with exteriority" (*ibid*, 69).

I will argue that, in some important ways, the two articulations of suspension are not as distinct as they may appear. There is no sin-consciousness in phenomenology, but it does fear and tremble at the crisis of contemporary

European civilization. Phenomenological investigations push beyond the limits of mere reason into faith, the reconnection with that which created us. What I am searching to uncover are interconnections and confluences of the two forms of suspension. This will occur in the fourth part of this essay, where we discuss the interesting intersections between Kierkegaard's authorship and Husserl's phenomenology in regard to suspensions.

KIERKEGAARD'S SUSPENSIONS VIEWED PHENOMENOLOGICALLY

"...Kierkegaard is at the origin of existential phenomenology."

– Paul Ricoeur, 1967, p. 207

On the other side of reason resides faith. In order to achieve faith, one must suspend reason. One cannot attain faith rationally, for it does not dwell in the domain of the rational. A clear understanding of what Kierkegaard meant by the teleological suspension of the ethical can be achieved upon careful study of his wider philosophies on the stages of an individual's life. Once one advances through the aesthetic stage to the ethical stage by choosing and committing herself to certain projects, she may discover that even the ethical-universal stage is incomplete, or that it needs more firm footing. The ethical-universal appears to be both guided by, yet also constrained by, the bounds of human rationality. Silentio, aware of this shortcoming of the ethical, looks to the religious stage, or to God, to give life its direction and telos (τέλος), i.e., its purpose. One teleologically suspends her ethical commitments in order to move ahead on the stages of life's way. As de Silentio observes in *Fear and Trembling*, God has commanded Abraham to sacrifice his only son, Isaac. This act would be a sin, a direct offense to the ethical-universal order – Abraham would immediately be considered a murderer. However, his was a direct command from God. So Abraham suspends his obligation to the ethical-universal, takes Isaac to Mount Moriah as directed, and is just about to sacrifice Isaac when God stops him from committing this act. God wished to test Abraham's faith, and for being a man of faith, Abraham obeyed his Lord. He had faith; not only in his Lord, but also that Isaac would somehow be returned to him. Abraham's faith shows us the religious mode of existence. His hope reveals and yields Isaac.

What happens when one returns from this suspension of the ethical-universal? Are things the same as they used to be? When Abraham returns from Mount Moriah, Isaac is returned to him. This 'return' to what was always-already there is not as simple or mundane as usual 'returns,' though. It is not like Isaac was a Christmas gift that Abraham decided did not fit right, so he returned him to the department store. Rather, Isaac was returned as a gift from God to Abraham. Abraham "got a son a second time" through his faith in the absurd (*FT*, 9).ⁱⁱ

Is Abraham's teleological suspension of the ethical identical to faith, or is it the precondition for faith? Can one person share their experiences of 'the other side' with someone else, or is this experience incommunicable? In the teleological suspension of the ethical, the single individual relates absolutely to the absolute, and relatively to the relative. What is being suspended is the notion that humanity has created the universal, that everything is ours. Abraham 'died' to the immediate command of God, and in doing so, the world and his son were, for the first time, given to him.

As Edmund Husserl inaugurated phenomenology with a suspension of the naturalistic attitude, Abraham (through de Silentio's reinterpretation) made a

major breakthrough toward the religious attitude through a suspension of the ethical. Abraham “walked down the narrow road [with]...no one to advise him” (*FT*, 67). Philosophy for Husserl and religious existence for Kierkegaard are initially done by the solitary individual in isolation from the ‘world,’ but upon return from the trial, return to a familiar place more vividly colored and able to be experienced more fully than before. Calvin Schrag has carefully pointed out that “religiously understood, Abraham’s intention was the supreme expression of a *courageous* faith.”ⁱⁱⁱ Looking backward, then, (how) does Abraham’s suspension, as observed through de Silentio, compare to the phenomenological reduction? It is in the following paragraphs that I examine the possibility of placing Kierkegaard in the phenomenological tradition.

Abraham’s choice of faith holds the ‘natural’ world in suspension. The ethical matrix is seen for what it is – a self-chosen, self-limiting, rational enterprise. Abraham thus makes the move beyond this domain – toward infinity. In an interpretation of Silentio’s recounting of the Abraham story, George Mooney observes

There is honor in relinquishing a world that identifies faith with a child-like absence of doubt, difficulty, or sacrifice; that encourages that conflation of God’s will and Reason; that lets ethics collapse into social convention.^{iv}

By “relinquishing” the “world,” one becomes more acutely aware of the world around her. This notion will have strong comparative value for Husserl’s epoché, or phenomenological reduction.

To begin to know anything is to renounce that one knows anything. Returning to Schrag, he notes that

...the suspension in the leap of faith is the suspension of a moral requirement which functions as a universal and subordinates the individual to its general moral sanction. The individual in his religious act of faith stands not in relation to the universal, but he stands in an indelibly personal and unique relation to the Absolute or God.^v

It is through radical interiority and self-emptying that we come into contact with the face of God. The ethical as mode of existence is not suspended; rather, the ethical *as universal moral requirement* is suspended. Schrag is careful to point out that the ethical as mode of existence is not discontinuous with the religious stage. It is not as though, in acting religiously, one is allowed to abstain from acting ethically. What counts as ethics receives new meaning and grounding in the religious stage. Abraham, in his singularity, understands by going beyond the bounds of reason and conventional moral rationality. It is thus that “the ethical must ultimately be rooted in the religious, and that it is only through the religious act that it receives its valid and authentic expression.”^{vi} The allegiance in such an existential act is no longer to the moral order, but to God (à-Dieu). As the prayer of St. Francis notes, “It is in giving that we receive.” When Abraham gave Isaac to God in the intended act of sacrifice, it is precisely at this point that Isaac is actually given to Abraham. Husserl, in his own investigations, notes that “I must lose the world by epoché, in order to regain it by a universal self-examination” (*CM*, 157). We can see, then, similar lines of writings and findings in Abraham’s gift for his paradoxical choice and Husserl’s re-discovery of what was always already there.

Mooney observes that “‘becoming subjective’ is in part renouncing the universal for the particular.”^{vii} An individual’s faith is then superior to the knowledge that the ethical-universal makes available. The telos of the ethical does not reside within the ethical-universal – it exists in the religious existence-communication. Now, Kierkegaard’s authors have been rightly dubbed phenomenological in the sense that they lend rigorous descriptions of the human dimension of reality. The task of faithfully describing the various facets, variations, and modes of existence in terms of what they themselves disclose is a major part of what is termed phenomenology – in this regard we could harness Kierkegaard into the phenomenological movement. In “Dialectics, Phenomenology, and the Sublime,” George Pattison considers this argument, but ultimately finds the ‘phenomenological’ moniker “inappropriate” for Kierkegaard. He observes many phenomenological analyses in the Kierkegaardian corpus, specifically in *The Concept of Anxiety* and *The Sickness Unto Death*, but he maintains that phenomenology cannot ultimately deliver one to faith in a proper God-relation. Nothing can do that, so in a sense Pattison is correct. It appears to me that Pattison is also right in his critique of Hegelian and Heideggerian phenomenologies, but I am not compelled by his argument against linking up a Kierkegaardian with a Husserlian phenomenology.^{viii} Even Kierkegaard’s phenomenology of despair in the *Sickness Unto Death* is only preparatory for the leap into faith.

What does it mean, phenomenologically, that ‘truth is subjectivity’? Does this position relativize truth into a Dr. Phil-esque “my truth is ...” and “your truth is ...”? Husserl’s reflections may be helpful here.

Philosophy – wisdom – is the philosophizer’s quite personal affair. It must arise as *his* wisdom, as his self-acquired knowledge tending toward universality, a knowledge for which he can answer from the beginning, and at each step, by virtue of his own insights (*CM*, 2; original emphasis).

It is at this point that we examine Husserl’s phenomenological suspension in light of Kierkegaard’s existential philosophies of the individual.

HUSSERL’S SUSPENSIONS VIEWED EXISTENTIALLY

“...before speculating, I exist.” – Emmanuel Levinas

“Husserl insisted that I should study Kierkegaard.” – Leon Shestov

No doubt, the critical questions posed to and by *Silentio* in *Fear and Trembling* have been similarly posed to Husserl – is there a suspension, and if so, what does it suspend? What happens after the suspension? For Husserl, the phenomenological suspension, or epoché, is the fundamental starting point of any adequate philosophical analysis. In it, the naturalistic attitude, which is the belief that the existence of the world is independent of consciousness, is bracketed. The naturalistic attitude, as is the case with Christendom in Christianity for Kierkegaard, is a naïve perspective. The Husserlian epoché is a willed, volitional act done by the investigator. In §15 of the *Cartesian Meditations*, Husserl asserts that phenomenological explication is at the same time phenomenological constitution which is at the same time transcendental self-criticism.

One of the major points of contention (and division) between Husserlians and other twentieth century phenomenologists (Heidegger, Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, etc.) has been over the possibility of the absolute epoché, the complete

bracketing of our sedimented and preconceived concept of consciousness as it approaches “the things themselves.” Post-Husserlians have rejected the completion or totality of the suspension of consciousness’ unquestioned assumptions. Why? A potentially apt Kierkegaardian response may be ‘due to a lack of faith in the absurd.’

What is left after Husserl’s epoché is pure consciousness, or the awareness of awareness, something that post-Husserlians would deny that we have access to – a paradoxical act of faith is thus required to go along with Husserl’s program. It appears possible that, among other issues, the problem that Heidegger, Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, and others had with Husserl’s epoché, or suspension, was that they were not taking the “leap of faith” and immersing themselves into the possibility of actually suspending their doubts or irresolutions regarding the next level of consciousness – the religious. By remaining ontologically immersed in the social (or ethical-universal), these poor fellows were not taking the next step – the flight to inwardness as transcendence. Phenomenology in its Husserlian stripe, like faith (or the life of spirit), must be lived before it is to be adequately discussed and explained.

The term epoché (ἐποχή) refers to the suspension of beliefs so that the phenomenon can be fully focused upon and understood. Kierkegaard calls it “the believing ἐποχή,” the suspension of belief (*FT*, 255). For this suspension to take place, Husserl argues that the investigator’s belief commitments to the natural attitude must be bracketed or suspended. The phenomenological reduction removes the thinker from the ‘real’ as she has constituted it in her consciousness. Bracketing enables the experience to be seen in terms of a new and unconventional perspective. This attitude of suspension is the “phenomenological attitude.” Outside the brackets there will be pure, ideal being, and truth which all philosophies seek. In the Cartesian Meditations, Husserl writes,

This universal depriving of acceptance, this “inhibiting” or “putting out of play” of all positions taken toward the already-given Objective world and, in the first place, all existential positions, -- or, as it is also called, this “phenomenological epoché” and “parenthesizing” of the Objective world – therefore does not leave us confronting nothing. On the contrary we gain possession of something by it; and what we acquire by it is pure living, with all the pure subjective processes making this up, and everything meant in them, purely as meant in them: the universe of “phenomena” in the phenomenological sense (*CM*, 20-21).

For Husserl, the life-world is the world we experience in everyday living. It is here that he turned his attention to the experience of the lived-world as the primary task of phenomenology. Related to the life-world is the concept of “horizon” which referred to the context in which one experiences things, people or feelings. Experiences are not isolated, but take place in particular contexts or horizons. Any phenomenon needs to be understood within its particular horizon

Husserl argues that

...the theme of phenomenologizing, as disclosed by the reduction [suspension], is not a region or a new field of being, transcendental subjectivity in antithesis to the world, but that it is constitutive process that must be comprehended as the object of phenomenologizing. This process goes out from constituting

transcendental subjectivity and terminates in the end-product, world (Husserl's *Sixth Cartesian Meditation*, p. 45).

As Kierkegaard maintained that he was the *reader* of his books and not the *author*, through Husserlian phenomenology, we can see ourselves as the investigators and co-creators of our world, and not as its sole authors. Within Husserlian phenomenology, there is room for faith. In fact, faith is required.

WHAT DO THE TWO SHARE IN COMMON? CONVERGENCES AND INTERSECTIONS

It should be rather evident that both versions of suspension are, if nothing else, to be seen as a voluntary act of the single individual; this is an egological undertaking. Within the two modes of suspension one is in humility and wonder and awe of the revelation of this creation – the world, transcendental subjectivity, and God. Husserl notes that “phenomenological explication does nothing but explicate the sense this world has for us all...and obviously gets solely from our experience – a sense in which philosophy can uncover but never alter” (*CM*, 151). As such, there is a sense of playfulness in the suspension, or bracketing of existence-claims. Finally, it is not possible to co-suspend with another – to reiterate, this is an egological undertaking.

As Silentio asserts that “one must have a clearer understanding of what faith is” (*FT*, 55), post-Husserlians needed to have a clearer understanding of what the phenomenological attitude is. Within the suspension (both Kierkegaardian and Husserlian), one stands over and against the world, while simultaneously being more “in” it than ever before. It is in this stage that the individual is higher than the universal. In the *Cartesian Meditations*, we read that “by excluding everything that leaves open any possibility of doubt, [Descartes] seeks to obtain a stock of things that are absolutely evident” (*CM*, 3). As we shall see, the post-leap or post-epoché individual does not “go” anywhere, but returns to her everyday life with qualitatively different and new perspectives. Where Kierkegaard will supersede Husserl is that, in the religious stage, the paradoxical nature of religion cannot be thought, whereas phenomenology maintains that objects as they present themselves to consciousness are sensible and comprehensible. What they maintain in common is that both faith and phenomenology are passionate exercises, one in the will (or the necessary renunciation of it), and the other in the commitment to reason and rationality. This issue will surface in Anti-Climacus' *Sickness Unto Death*. As Silentio writes, “[...] that which unites all human life is passion, and faith is a passion” (*FT*, 67). Both Kierkegaardian existential philosophy and Husserlian phenomenology maintain that self-investigation is the one way to truth, religious or worldly. In order to achieve this truth, this unconditioned condition, certain suspensions of traditionally accepted ways of being are to be suspended. This is a paradox that both Kierkegaard and Husserl share as being absolutely essential to living an authentic life. Silentio observes, “...the knight of faith relinquishes the universal in order to become the single individual” (*FT*, 75). Against the assertion that “philosophy teaches that the immediate should be annulled,” Kierkegaard's and Husserl's projects emphatically hold fast to the self-evident, the “things themselves.” The single, existing individual is more important than the ethical-universal, or the naturalistic attitude, and both Kierkegaard and Husserl maintained a sense of hope for the beings within Being, remaining fully planted in the ontic sphere.

Both Kierkegaard and Husserl see the “present age” as one that is sickly and in critical condition.^{ix} Their methods of self-discovery and engendering a position of being aware of one’s awareness are crucial to work through this illness, and toward a reclamation of the human-dimension of humanity. To fuse Kierkegaard and Husserl together, in *The Sickness unto Death*, we read that the human being, or the self is spirit. Anti-Climacus writes that “a human being is a synthesis of the infinite and the finite, of the temporal and the eternal, of freedom and necessity, in short a synthesis” (*SUD*, 13). At the end of the “Vienna Lecture,” Husserl shows the possible directions for European rationality – either crash and burn or rise “like a phoenix from the ashes.” Husserl writes

If we struggle against this greatest of all dangers...with the sort of courage that does not fear even an *infinite struggle*, then out of the destructive blaze of lack of faith, the smoldering fire of *despair* over the West’s mission for humanity, the ashes of great weariness, will rise up the phoenix of a new life-inwardness and spiritualization as the pledge of a great and distant future for man: for *the spirit alone is immortal* (*CES*, 299; emphasis mine).

Becoming an authentic existing self is the common theme among Kierkegaard’s authors and Husserl’s repeated ‘introductions’ to phenomenology. It seems plausible that we could read Kierkegaard’s pseudonymous authors as paralleling Husserl’s various ‘introductions’ to phenomenology. Both series of ‘authorships’ are intended to meet the reader on her own terms, and not promote a dogmatic system of heteronomous standards and practices. Removing the layers of ethical-universal, or naturalistic sedimentation, to reveal the true self-in-relation seems to be the strongest link between Kierkegaard’s and Husserl’s projects. Existential philosophy and phenomenology are both infinite tasks with one common goal – the “radicalness of self-responsibility” of human beings. As Christianity was a constant beginning or struggle for Kierkegaard and his authors, phenomenology is always re-inaugurating itself to its objects of analysis. Of course, Anti-Climacus’ *Sickness Unto Death* posits despair as sin and this is that phenomenology on its own cannot reveal. Sin is the radical form of suspension, and faith here is an extra-mundane act.

CONCLUSIONS

“‘The individual’ is the category through which, in a religious aspect, this age, all history, the human race as a whole, must pass.” – Kierkegaard, *PV*, p. 128

“Positive science is lost in the world. I must lose the world by epoché, in order to regain it by a universal self-examination. ‘Do not wish to go out,’ says Augustine, ‘go back into yourself. Truth dwells in the inner man.’” – Husserl, *CM*, p. 157

Is it safe to say that both Kierkegaard’s and Husserl’s writings were *works of love*? Probably. In Kierkegaard’s, as well as Husserl’s writings, there is a profound sense of respect, dignity, and hope for humanity. Kierkegaard’s pseudonymous authors are staged to meet their readers on the readers’ own place on the path of self-discovery. In Christianity, one is as one does; the individual in a faith-relationship with God will act accordingly with and to her neighbor. Similarly, in Husserl’s last work, the *Crisis of European Sciences*, he

exhibits a deep concern for the fate of European modernity and rationality, and goes to extreme efforts to exemplify a path away from self-destruction and nuclear holocaust. Both thinkers are deeply suspicious of the “present age,” that it is “devoid of passion, flaring up in the superficial, short-lived enthusiasm, and prudentially relaxing in indolence” (*EK*, 252).

However, it appears that, in both cases of suspension, there is an apparent offense happening. The one doing the suspending is looking at the current state of affairs as incomplete, as inappropriately totalizing, when the infinite lies beyond this totality. What others see as offensive is seen by the one doing the suspending as important and necessary. Leon Shestov recounts:

...why did Husserl refer me so insistently to Kierkegaard? With his [Kierkegaard's] characteristic penetration, anticipating both Husserl and Nietzsche, Kierkegaard declared that the more profound, significant, and endowed with genius a man is, the more absolutely is he dominated by the idea of fate. But...he did not regard this as a sign of greatness. It is not easy...to admit this, but it must be said that the man of genius is a great sinner.^x

Further, Bernard Martin observes that “if philosophy is to serve the human spirit rather than destroy it, it must – Shestov maintains – abandon the method of detached speculation and disinterested reflection (what Husserl called *Besinnung*); it must become truly ‘existential’ in the sense of issuing out of man’s sense of helplessness and despair in the face of the stone walls of natural necessity.”^{xi}

It has been said that, throughout his life’s work, Husserl played the role of a Moses, showing (seducing us) the way to the Promised Land. Kierkegaard and his pseudonymous writers similarly played the role of the spiritual seducer, the maieutic, where they served as different “moments” or “occasions” for teaching and spiritual awakening.^{xii} Next, similar to the fact that phenomenological epoché can only be performed by a single individual act of consciousness, faith cannot exist en masse, either. As many of Husserl’s texts were subtitled “An Introduction to Phenomenology,” both he and Kierkegaard understood the importance of re-beginning (or repetition) from scratch, from not becoming complacent with the way things were. One must constantly strive to push farther, to dig deeper, into the responsibility and freedom of subjectivity, and by extension, intersubjectivity.

Shestov writes, “It is possible to understand and judge Husserl only if one grasps his profound inner relation to Kierkegaard.”^{xiii} Through one example of this “profound inner relation” between Kierkegaard and Husserl, I have attempted to discover and investigate the confluent notions of suspensions in the works of both writers. Both thinkers struggled to have their reader self-awaken and rearrange their lives, to forge down new and uncharted terrain, to struggle to become the self that they are intended to be. Husserl argued, and Kierkegaard would agree, that “particularity and universality are not mutually exclusive” modes of being (*EJ*, 377).

In his recent writings, Lewis R. Gordon has been arguing that the outstanding thinkers in the history of ideas have looked “beyond the center for future directions.” He has dubbed this search the “teleological suspension of philosophy,” and by this he means “the elimination of complacency in philosophy for the sake of commitments that ultimately transcend philosophy as understood in one’s time.”^{xiv} Both Kierkegaard and Husserl, Gordon maintains,

were “willing to give up philosophy for something higher.” As western philosophy’s progenitor, Plato searched for the Good beyond Being. So do Kierkegaard and Husserl. Their legacies continue to educate and edify readers and practitioners of their writings. Kierkegaard and Husserl dared to be original and explore and push the limits of human understanding. We would be wise to do similarly.

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NOTES:

ⁱ Shestov 1962, p. 454. Shestov later recalls that "Husserl *insisted* that I should study Kierkegaard" (462; emphasis mine). In the translator's introduction to Shestov's *Athens and Jerusalem* (1966), Bernard Martin writes, "[Shestov and Husserl] had a profound respect for each other. It was at Husserl's home in Freiburg that Shestov, when he came to the German university town to lecture in 1929, met Heidegger. When Heidegger left the house after a long philosophical discussion, Husserl urged Shestov to acquaint himself with the work of Heidegger, hitherto unknown to him, and indicated that some of Heidegger's fundamental ideas have been inspired by the nineteenth-century Danish thinker." Later, Martin recounts, "Husserl's exclamation [that Shestov read Kierkegaard], according to Shestov's testimony and witness, was not the calm recommendation of a man who simply knows something about another field, but the outburst of a man who had a passionate relationship with Kierkegaard's work, and who in other conversations spoke of his own thought in terms of Kierkegaard's 'either/or'" (Martin, 1966). It should be noted (if not obvious) that I intend to explore Shestov's work specifically on Kierkegaard and Husserl in a future project.

ⁱⁱ Silentio later observes that "By faith Abraham did not renounce Isaac, but by faith Abraham received Isaac" (*FT*, 49).

ⁱⁱⁱ Schrag, 1959, p. 66; emphasis mine

^{iv} Mooney, 1992, p. 72

^v *ibid.*, p. 67

^{vi} *ibid.*, p. 67

^{vii} Mooney, 1992, p. 74

^{viii} This is not the appropriate venue for a critique of Pattison, so I will leave this counter-argument to the side, and move on.

^{ix} See Husserl's last work, the *Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology*.

^x Shestov, 1962, p. 465

^{xi} Martin, 1966

^{xii} In Maurice Natanson's *Edmund Husserl: Philosopher of Infinite Tasks*, he likens Husserl to a philosophical Columbus, where "Husserl [began] appropriating the prize of discovery" (1973, p. 9).

^{xiii} *ibid.*, p. 470

^{xiv} Gordon, 2001. Gordon later clarifies this notion of the "teleological suspension of philosophy" as he emphasizes that, in this suspension, thinkers "are guided by a sense of there being concerns greater than philosophical ones, which, perhaps like the ultimate religious ethical dimensions of God in the Kierkegaardian formulation, where the ethical re-emerges on the level of religious faith in spite of its suspension at the level of universal morality, means that there is something paradoxically philosophical about a teleological suspension of philosophy" (Gordon, 2002). In a different venue, Husserl, as recounted by Shestov, mentioned that "I [Husserl] began to seek the truth precisely where no one had sought it before...." (Shestov, 1962, p. 451). This adds textual support to Gordon's argument.