

## KIERKEGAARD AND/OR PHILOSOPHY

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By discussing *The Concept of Anxiety*, often called Kierkegaard's most difficult book, I wish to suggest his relationship to philosophy or, at least, to what he considered philosophy's standpoint. Kierkegaard did not consider himself a philosopher but rather a Christian. It is the Christian standpoint he opposes to the philosophical standpoint, showing the reader by this opposition what characteristics he considers each to have.

Kierkegaard's Christian approach to the human condition is evidenced by his choosing anxiety as a fundamental concept. He explicitly links anxiety with a central Christian dogma. He says, 'the psychological treatment of the concept of "anxiety", but in such a way that it constantly keeps *in mente* and before its eye the dogma of hereditary sin'<sup>14</sup>. † His approach to the human condition locates a science—psychology—within the framework arising from a religious dogma. This is surely problematic. As always with Kierkegaard, there is the matter of standpoint; the question of which intellectual instrument—with, as he puts it, its 'mood'—is, and how it is, appropriate. In contrast to the standpoint he has chosen, he says of philosophy or metaphysics:

If sin is dealt with in metaphysics, the mood becomes that of dialectical uniformity and disinterestedness, it ponders sin as something that cannot stand the scrutiny of thought. The concept of sin is also altered, for sin is indeed to be overcome, yet not as something to which thought is unable to give life, but as that which is, and as such concerns every man<sup>15</sup>.

I will return to this characterisation of metaphysics. First, I'll consider Kierkegaard's linking psychology to dogmatic belief. What Kierkegaard means by psychology needs clarification, especially about its power to understand the human condition. What psychology is as a standpoint or mood is given a clear statement: 'If sin is dealt with in psychology, the mood becomes one of persistent observation... The mood of psychology would be antipathetic curiosity, whereas the proper mood is earnestness expressed in courageous resistance'<sup>15</sup>. This description suggests psychology and religious dogma are unstable as allies. They are not synthesisable into a unified mood. Psychology—science—can therefore be considered only as an *ancilla* to the religious perception. It is a preparatory but not a consummatory standpoint. Consider: 'Sin does not properly belong to any science, but is the subject of the sermon, in which the single individual speaks as the single individual to the single individual'<sup>16</sup>. Kierkegaard obviously finds the religious aspect of the relationship to be more fundamental than and different from science. Dogma, however, is not most

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†The numbers after quotes from *The Concept of Anxiety* refers to the page numbers of the translated text cited at the end of this article; it is not a footnote.

fundamental to the religious standpoint. It too is a science and not religious experience. Kierkegaard presents the fulfillment of psychology in this *other* science: dogmatics. He says, 'As psychology becomes deeply absorbed in the possibility of sin, it is unwittingly in the service of another science that only waits for it to finish so that it can begin and assist psychology to the explanation. . . . This science is dogmatic, and here in turn the issue of hereditary sin appears. While psychology thoroughly explores the real possibility of sin, dogmatics explains hereditary sin, that is, the ideal possibility of sin'<sup>23</sup>.

The obvious question is why Kierkegaard contrasts science and religious experience when speaking of sin and joins two sciences when speaking of hereditary sin. Of course dogmatics is considered a science because it is conceptually and systematically developed. For Kierkegaard, a science need not be a natural or empirical science. Sciences explore only the possibility of sin, even dogmatics. The religious experience, however, provides an experience of the actuality of sin. Yet if one considers sin and hereditary sin from different standpoints doesn't the relationship between them become problematic?

The nature of the individual person is the essential problematic which introduces itself into all other matters. Consequently, the meaning of Kierkegaard's 'single individual'—his key concept—projects itself into all discussions and standpoints or, better, all discussions of standpoint are projections of it. They are optical determinations or partial disclosures of individual existence. Is there a system for such disclosures? Kierkegaard thinks not, it is disclosed in religious experience. Yet he allows for a hierarchy of intellectual tools for approaching such a disclosure, e.g. dogmatics completing psychology.

If one had to aim one question at Kierkegaard's Gordian knot of questions it surely is: 'What is to be made of the existence of the single individual?' For Kierkegaard, he is the sort of person who has the capacity for 'appropriation'<sup>16</sup>, that is, for thinking and acting appropriately and, therefore, he alone can converse with another single individual. Appropriation seems to be the property of one who has a foundation or grounding in the true, for saying things where words are deeds. Kierkegaard reminds us of Socrates' words as deeds in contrast to the sophists' verbal misdeeds and logomachy. If the single individual can have a conversation, as Kierkegaard thinks, he may be ignorant about many things but, nevertheless, he can learn from another single individual about his ground or standpoint. This 'appropriation' is transformatory. The ground of his own being becomes disclosed to him through the other and penetrates what becomes the new reality of the relationship.

Kierkegaard's discussion of the single individual as conversationalist appears in the 'Introduction'. This is also true of the other material I have hitherto mentioned. Indeed, I think the 'Introduction' to *The Concept of Anxiety* excellently anticipates the book as a whole. This provides evidence that the book polemically stands against Hegel since the 'Introduction' overtly stands against Hegel. Consequently, the issue of the single individual is in opposition to the meaning of individual existence in Hegel.

Let us consider Hegel's definition of sophistry. Hegel also takes Socrates to stand in opposition to the sophists and also remarks on the anti-conversational intent of the sophist.

For sophistry has nothing to do with what may be taught: with what may possibly be true. Sophistry lies in the formal grounds for teaching it by grounds which are available for attack or defense. (*Logic*, 178, 121.)

The aptness of Hegel's definition helps with Kierkegaard's concept of appropriation. The sophist's 'formal' relationship to words and thought is without a ground in his own existence. The words are not so to speak owned they are merely used. One owns one's words or deeds when appropriation is possible, that is, when one intends to know and to communicate. (For Hegel the emphasis shifts from the *intention* to know to *actually* knowing.)

Since the self is staked in conversation as having a ground, while seeking to clarify that ground, it is not possible in authentic character for the self to intend to falsify itself. The sophist, on the other hand, must always ignore or falsify the self by refusing to speak in a way that deals with the ground of the self: even his telling the truth is a sort of lie, since he is not a true man. He is tangential to truth or falsehood, as Hegel points out; his aim is tyrannical power. The tyrant/sophist, as Plato well understood, lives for the collective: its weaknesses are his surface. He has traded the depth of self—the quality of the single individual—for the power to move the benighted many. His exercising this power means he is possessed by their weak surface. He, therefore, can converse neither with the single individual nor with the many for he is without a standpoint, without character in the moral sense; he creates a self by mirrors.

Hegel would hardly put the same weight, a unique heaviness of existence, on the single individual. Hegel's view of existence allows for a unified totality which is opposite to the tyranny of the many. Conversation for him is genuine and true when it captures the objective character of totality as well as the subjective one of intent. For him, the sophist suffers a loss of existence. He says, 'An existence only proceeds from the ground' (*Logic*, 179, 122) and, also:

The ground is the unity of identity and difference, the truth of what difference and identity have turned out to be—the reflection-into-self, which is equally a reflection-into-an-other, and vice versa. It is essence put explicitly as a totality. (*Logic*, 175, 121.)

For Hegel the sophist is, in a manner of speaking, made only from difference and this is his identity; he is without self-identity. He has no ground therefore, and the mere numerical totality or mob from which he gets his substance and power makes his subjective relationship to it, his aim to control it, the aimless superficiality of a mere reflection-of-others. Thus it is a false totality and Hegel contrasts it with the systematic condition of a true or concrete totality: the citizen in the universal and homogenous state. I think this is implied and enlarged upon in Hegel's political writings.

Existence is the immediate unity of reflection-into-self and reflection-into-another. It follows from this that existence is the indefinite multitude of existents as reflected-into-themselves, which at the same time throws light upon one another—which, in short, are co-relative, and form a world of reciprocal dependence and of infinite interconnections between ground and consequents. The grounds are themselves

existences: and the existents in a like manner are in many directions grounds as well as consequences. (*Logic*, 179, 123.)

Kierkegaard does not see the ground of the existence of the single individual in terms of a multiplicity of reciprocal relationships. One expects Kierkegaard to disagree with Hegel on the nature of the single individual who, as a Christian, one assumes, must find 'the strait gate and the narrow way wherein only one can enter abreast'. In fact, he accuses Hegel of sophistry in that 'he *à tout prix* must explain everything'<sup>20</sup>. Kierkegaard suggests here what becomes clearer in the body of the work, namely, that existence cannot be explained. Hegel's sophistic tyranny, for him, is in providing a forced truth to explain existence when just that cannot be explained. (In this regard, Kierkegaard contrasts Socrates and Schleiermacher to Hegel.) Whether or not this accusation is correct, what is meant by the single individual depends on it; for the single individual existence is not taken as both a ground and consequent—systematically bringing him into a totality—but, simply as ground. This single individual seeks unity so he can stand appropriately in relation to others rather than having the full ensemble of relations among all persons (citizens) for Hegel's totality or state unity. And so when Kierkegaard says, 'sin has no specific place and this is its nature'<sup>14</sup> he finds in sin the denial of what the individual is by his having a ground: sin is a sort of sophistry. For Hegel or, as Kierkegaard calls it, the standpoint of metaphysics, sin is a mistake. As a complete systematic explanation of existence it explains sin away by considering it merely a partialness and false individuality. To quote Hegel, it is in a 'position of severed life . . . [where] the principle of restoration is found in thought, and thought only'. (*Logic*, 43, 24). For Hegel, the existence of the individual is in and for reality. This is explainable by thought through its totalising the individual's ground by locating it within the whole ensemble of secular relations. Only thereby, does the negativity of partialness become transparent. Kierkegaard understands this aspect of Hegel's project and finds it to fail in the need of the system for conceptual movement. He finds wrong Hegel's concept of the negative which is necessary for that movement. For one, this negative is something vanishing—'that which is annulled'—though it is immanent in the actual. Also, he says, it is used so 'it becomes that which brings forth opposition, not a negation but a contraposition . . . *the necessary other*'. Turning from the logic to the ethics we find again the same indefatigable negative which is active in the entire Hegelian philosophy. Here one is astonished to discover the negative is the evil'<sup>13</sup>.

For Kierkegaard, then, Hegel through the spurious use of the negative, mistakenly considers evil from the viewpoint of the system as a whole. The ethical use of the negative seems to relate to its two rather different functions in the system. The system uses it extrinsically and objectively, as nothing, and also, immanently and subjectively, that is, provisionally, as a contraposition. It is necessary for the system's concept of partialness. This relates to the secular thread in Hegel's assumptions . . . he has a concept of evil but not a concept of sin. It seems not unjust to say Hegel might consider the concept of the single individual prideful and Kierkegaard considers the concept of system superficial. As irony might have it, these are just the charges each wishes most to avoid.

The unbridgable hiatus between essence and existence is championed by

Kierkegaard. Hegel's metaphysics, equated with philosophy, is criticised for any claim of being capable to explain existence by a theory of Being. For Kierkegaard, philosophical thought merely deals with essences. Its disinterestedness and objectivity mislays the existential dimension of the single individual; it cannot find the ground of his existence within the systematic and/or essentialist treatment of concepts. It offers merely the masquerading of 'reflected-by-and-into-the totality' for the contingency or actuality of existence. Hegel's triumphant logical march of *Geist* to freedom needs 'soldiers'—provided by rigid categories—rather than individuals. So Kierkegaard says, 'the contingent which is an essential part of the actual cannot be admitted within the realm of logic'<sup>10</sup>. This is against 'an author [Hegel] who entitles the last section of the *Logic*, "Actuality"<sup>19</sup>.

In proceeding from the 'Introduction' to the rest of *The Concept of Anxiety*, one discovers the concept of anxiety is central for treating the contingent existence of the single individual. This is the proper discussion of actuality for Kierkegaard: 'That anxiety makes its appearance is a pivot upon which everything turns'<sup>43</sup>. The concept considered as a primordial condition explains Adam's state before the Fall. This primordialness relates not only dogmatically to Adam but, also, it has universal psychological meaning, Kierkegaard asserts that each person experiences the same mental development as Adam. In other words, 'to explain Adam's sin is to explain hereditary sin . . . the most profound reason for this is what is essential to human existence: that man is an *individuum* and as such simultaneously himself and the whole race, and in such a way that the whole race participates in the individual and the individual in the whole race'<sup>28</sup>. I take this participation to mean that both from a psychological and a dogmatic viewpoint existence confronts each individual with a similar challenge. Further, as far as sin, each person has the same psychological structure. Certainly, as we have seen, for Kierkegaard unity or participation is not to be conceptualised in the totalisation of a system. It relates to the unpredictable appropriation of existence for the individual's destiny. The discussion of anxiety, by being initiated as a problem of hereditary sin, or simply of sin, signals the reader that Kierkegaard's view of human unity is meant to replace Hegel's view. For Hegel, the unity achieved through totality demands an evolutionary, directionally necessary, transformation of standpoint in the march to totality; the completion of the march corrects the partiality of the concrete historical moments of the way and provides the standard for adequate appreciation of those moments when final perfect maturity is attained. Opposed to this, Kierkegaard views the same Christian standpoint is timelessly demanded of a single individual: 'at every moment the individual is both himself and the race'<sup>29</sup>. Progress in science or politics does not touch the fundamental challenge of existence.

In Kierkegaard's language, transcendence is valued beyond and opposed to Hegel's immanence that 'through a continued quantification a new quality is brought forth . . . the drift into logical movement'<sup>30</sup>. Though Kierkegaard may be unfair to Hegel, this shows his own meaning of transcendence. He continues, 'The new quality appears [instead] with the first [sin], with the leap, with the suddenness of the enigmatic'<sup>30</sup>. Is the enigmatic here tractable; is it open to intellectual pursuit? This question is crucial and stands aside from Kierkegaard's criticism of Hegel. Indeed, it is questionable that any of his particular criticisms

of Hegel destroys the possibility of philosophy to handle quality. Yet, Kierkegaard's criticism of a logicity in Hegel, which only spuriously includes motion through mediation or negativity, has force. Kierkegaard says:

Every moment [of Hegel's logic] is an immanent movement, which in a profound sense is no movement at all. One can easily convince oneself of this by considering that the concept of movement is itself a transcendence that has no place in logic<sup>13</sup>.

In a word, at best, Hegel cannot rise above a description of movement—and, thus, its ideality. Kierkegaard's point is that Hegel does not explain movement itself, despite presenting a system describing concrete historical events from the viewpoint of the structure of ideas or the ideal. The quality of movement considered as a contingent factor of human existence and necessary for the freedom of the single individual is Kierkegaard's trump card: 'Thus sin comes into the world as the sudden, i.e. by a leap . . . [which] posits the quality'<sup>32</sup>. Kierkegaard's strategy is to first show the falsity of the sort of thought amenable to discursive language. The crucial matter is the event. The event is experiencable though not open to logic. It is the Christian experience that is necessary to the freedom of the single individual. The cogency of such 'events' as Adam's Fall is understood through one's own experience demanding that each individual experience the qualitative movement from innocence to sinfulness:

. . . every individual begins anew, and in the same moment he is at the place where he should begin in history. Here as everywhere, it is true that if one wants to maintain a dogmatic definition in our day, one must begin by forgetting what Hegel has discovered in order to help dogmatics . . . Hegel has quite consistently volatilized every dogmatic concept just enough to appeal to a man of reduced existence as a clever expression of the logical. That the immediate must be annulled, we do not need Hegel to tell us, nor does he deserve immortal merit for having said it, since it is not even logically correct, for the immediate is not to be annulled, because it at no times exists. The concept of immediacy belongs in logic; the concept of innocence on the other hand, belongs in ethics<sup>35</sup>.

The man to whom Hegel speaks is considered one 'of reduced existence'. Kierkegaard finds even in dogmatics a way of speaking that contains more quality. This is the background for examining the biblical mythos of Adam. Kierkegaard says, 'innocence is ignorance'<sup>37</sup> and it is 'lost only by guilt'<sup>36</sup>. 'Innocence is always lost by the qualitative leap of the individual . . . innocence is cancelled by transcendence.'<sup>37</sup> This concerns the individual in a sense of spirit quite differently than *Geist* in Hegel: 'In innocence man is not qualified as spirit but is psychically qualified in immediate unity with his natural condition. The spirit in man is dreaming'<sup>41</sup>. Instead of freedom in a full sense, Adam has anxiety which is called 'entangled freedom'<sup>49</sup>. Kierkegaard seems to mean Adam's creatureliness is incomplete. He has both a body and rational abilities but an important third and synthesising factor is missing: spirit, without which he is deprived of freedom in the full sense. When he is aware of freedom fully he faces existential contingency. Anxiety provides the motion from innocence to spirit. The definition that Kierkegaard gives of it is interestingly suggestive of Aristotle's famous definition of motion in the *Physics*: 'anxiety is freedom's

actuality as the possibility of possibility'<sup>42</sup>. Kierkegaard is not clear how anxiety is merely 'entangled freedom' before the Fall and full freedom after it. It is used too ubiquitously and, as a way of understanding 'beginnings', it seems obscure. At any rate, Kierkegaard sees God's prohibition not to eat of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil as a necessary road to freedom. Before the Fall, Adam is not yet a single individual and God's words send him in search of his spirit. His anxiety is an oppression by 'nothing'. This is a pre-condition to the post-Edenic state where he is oppressed by possibilities. In innocence Adam does not need possibility because he is blessed yet, nevertheless, the prohibition presents a demand for self-consciousness not included in the blessing of innocence. This is a state of ignorance or of being oppressed by 'nothing' or a 'I-know-not-what'—Adam feels the 'enormous ambiguity' of this state of being: 'The prohibition induces in him anxiety, for the prohibition awakens in him freedom's possibility'<sup>44</sup>. From innocence, Adam, by means of anxiety, makes a qualitative leap to an awakened spirit . . . to the state of the single individual. There is an actualisation of the self in this. Man is open to a standpoint: 'Man can attain the ultimate point only in the moment when the spirit becomes actual.

Kierkegaard's understanding of Adam's sin is extended to every person. He says, 'and remember that every subsequent individual begins in the same way'<sup>90</sup>. The analysis of sin and the forms anxiety takes is extended in subtle and complex ways. As interesting as these are their intellectual persuasiveness depends on the foundation discussed above in relation to Adam. But what is one to make of this foundation?

One critical approach is to disagree with Kierkegaard's theology. If I impersonate my rabbinical grandfather, in his spirit, I could offer an alternative theology—less 'goyish' in its emphasis on guilt. I could say, for example, that since God created Adam in his paradigm he was created free and understood that his disobedience to God meant sin though he did not know the consequences of disobedience. One important consequence is the confusion of good with evil and it is this, after the disobedience, which brings anxiety to the post-Edenic scene. This makes for the struggle thereafter confronting man. It is through a turning and returning (*teshuvah*) to God, which includes trust (*emunah*), that anxiety is destroyed and the world is mended (*tikkun*). As the great exegete Rashi points out, Adam is like a child in Eden and God is taken as the Father; after Eden, man can also relate to God as a King, as indeed, God by covenant so stands to all children of Israel. Aware of the consequence of disobedience to God, fear is one aspect of man's response to God. The intimacy of childish innocence between man and God is replaced by an awareness of the distance between them, between Creator and created. The anxiety involved in the fearful distance is however overcome by *emunah* and *teshuvah* and holy awe replaces anxiety. The kingship of God over Israel makes them a holy people. Each individual Jew is unified—by words and deeds—in and for a people whose glory is in standing in awe of the Holy One, blessed be His Name.

This fictive theological exercise makes a point: though Kierkegaard presents his dogmatic stance as the alternative to Hegel and philosophy, why accept his Christian faith. There are competing dogmas after all. Further, I don't find it convincing as a psychological portrait of my own experience. It doesn't ring true as psychological phenomenology. And since Kierkegaard's approach depends

on a sympathy of experience there is little more to be said.

I'll recapitulate with some elaboration. In *The Concept of Anxiety*, I consider Kierkegaard to pursue the destructive intention of opposing Hegel and systematic metaphysics and the constructive intention of presenting an alternative standpoint linked to Christian dogmatics. Nietzsche, in his intellectual autobiography, *Ecce Homo*, says that Wagner was for him the temptation of modernity and, surely, it is appropriate to say Hegel presented a similar temptation to Kierkegaard. Hegel, as the philosophical eminence of the age is challenged by Kierkegaard's single individual: 'a truth for everyone and no one'. Kierkegaard prefers 'the wide-wings of eternity' to oppose Hegel's modernity. Indeed, he gives a particularly strong emphasis to eternity in that opposition: 'As long as the eternal is not introduced, the moment is not, or is only a *discrimens* [boundary]'<sup>91</sup>.

The attack against Hegel proceeds along the following lines:

(1) Hegel is in a false philosophical tradition. This tradition holds thought can know and encompass actuality or existence. This tradition goes back at least to Parmenides. Indeed, Hegel recognises this:

Philosophy began in the Eleatic school, especially with Parmenides, who conceives the absolute as Being, saying that 'Being alone is and Nothing is not.' Such was the true starting-point of philosophy, which is always knowledge by thought: and here for the first time we find pure thought seized and made an object of thought (*Logic*, 126, 86).

(2) Kierkegaard opposes philosophical thought understood in this sense. He takes Hegel's and Parmenides' project as 'pure thought made the object of thought', a logic capable only of dead quantification. Its categories are incapable of holding what is most important to Kierkegaard: existence, whose attributes are (a) contingency, (b) quality and (c) freedom.

(3) Finally, because of this, Hegel's system, cannot include the single individual who only can be understood by each person's similar experience of sin. Consequently, Hegel wrongheadedly attempts a system 'to climb the ice ladder of logic' (Nietzsche's phrase for Parmenides in *Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks*). The system rests on a mistake about negativity (mediation, transition) resulting from confusing logic with the motion of actual existence.

Kierkegaard's constructive aspect emphasises the standpoint of the single individual whose freedom, spiritual being, quality, and faithfulness is logically uncashable. The single individual cannot be included in a system and so philosophy, as a systematic presentation of reality, is faulted. Indeed, any ordered complex of categories, any science, e.g. psychology or even dogmatics, can only explain the self and its quality in a limited way for it is necessarily external to the 'leap' or movement of an existential experience. It objectifies the self thereby losing the subject's contingent quality of presence: the necessary, significant aspect in any event. Sciences are useful but for the fulfillment of the individual they must be completed by experience of one's own ground. The single individual is open to his own experience. This is hidden and not sought after when human beings are not single individuals. Being a Christian is to be a single individual. It opens the single individual to transcendent leaps.

Every science lies either in a logical immanence or in an immanence within a transcendence that it is unable to explain<sup>50</sup>.

Thus psychology and dogmatics, both of which deal with sin, must be understood in relation to transcendence. Consequently Adam's sin is paradigmatic only because subjective experience attests to its probity. Kierkegaard, generalising from his own experiences, must be part of this method. His understanding of the single individual thus can be criticized as a hasty generalisation. One need not agree with this experience that 'Now sin is precisely that transcendence, that *discrimen rerum* [crisis [existential boundary]] in which sin enters into the individual as a single individual'. For Kierkegaard this entrance is through anxiety. Psychology and dogmatics consider anxiety but it is most significantly understood by the individual's own leap of transcendence. Again, one may interject, since anxiety is fundamentally a matter of experience, Kierkegaard makes an assumptive leap in considering his own experience exemplary. But to continue, in the initial form, anxiety stands with and against innocence; it provokes the leap from innocence into full spiritual freedom: 'The elasticity of the leap . . . is also a synthesis of the temporal and the eternal'<sup>85</sup>. This is a movement of faith having the feeling of the line in Rimbaud's poem 'Éternité': 'Elle est arrivée. Quoi? L'éternité'. Consider Kierkegaard:

The present is the eternal, or rather, the eternal is the present, and the present is full<sup>86</sup>.

The pivotal concept in Christianity, that which makes all things new, is the fullness of time, but the fullness of time is the moment as the eternal, and yet this eternal is also the future and the past<sup>90</sup>.

With the help of faith, anxiety brings up the individuality to rest in providence. So it is also in relation to guilt . . . whosoever learns to know his guilt only from the finite is lost in the finite, and finitely the question of whether a man is guilty cannot be determined except in external, juridical, and a most imperfect sense<sup>161</sup>.

Specifically, the faith of the Christian is involved in the leap and brings one to eternity and also providence. But eternity *excludes* time and providence *includes* time. The merger of these is exactly the extraordinariness of Kierkegaard's experience. The ground of his single individual is opaque because these merge together. Is the ground the infinite or is it the finite aware of possibilities in which it expresses its freedom?

However one evaluates either the specific merits of Kierkegaard's arguments against philosophy, or Hegel, and whether or not one disagrees with his understanding of what religious experience is or what it means to be a Christian, I believe the point of the paper is clear: Kierkegaard does not write as a philosopher. Those who wish him to be considered a philosopher, *malgré lui*, speak against his own understanding. He decidedly opposes the philosophical or discursive approach to the human condition: it can never reach the goal of self-knowledge provided by Christian experience. I see this opposition as sharp and not to be fudged and at the very basis of his standpoint. Those who consider

Kierkegaard as a philosopher are surely not Kierkegaardians for any argument for such a consideration involves more than a slight shift. It is a radical critique of his position.

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## NOTES

All quotations from Kierkegaard have been taken from: *The Concept of Anxiety: A Simple Psychologically Orienting Deliberation on the Dogmatic Issue of Hereditary Sin*, ed. and trans. Reidar Thomte, in collaboration with Albert B. Anderson (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980).

All quotations from Hegel have been taken from: *Logic [Part I, Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences]*, trans. William Wallace (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975). The method of citation is simply to give the page number for Kierkegaard and to give the page number and paragraph for Hegel.

For a companion article, see my 'Kierkegaard: How a Clever Theologian finds Unhappiness', *Sophie* (1988), pp. 31–41. It deals with *Sickness unto Death*.