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OBSERVATIONS ON UNAMUNO AND KIERKEGAARD

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The generally accepted idea that Kierkegaard is one of the great influences in Unamuno led me to make an earnest effort to trace the extent of his influence in Unamuno’s work. I searched for a reason which would justify Unamuno’s calling Kierkegaard his “brother” and was surprised to discover the deep gap which separates their concepts of life, truth, and religion. On all major issues, on history, art, religion, on the relationship between the individual and society, on such philosophical concepts as unity and nothingness, there exist diametrically opposed views. Both approach these problems as men of faith. In that light they are presented here. Though a complete picture of their points of view would take more than can be said in a brief commentary such as this, the observations made are quite sufficient to give a fair estimate of Kierkegaard’s limited position in Unamuno’s writings.

First let us consider their concepts of history. On May 10, 1900, Unamuno wrote to Clarín: “El núcleo de mi estudio ‘La fe’ es de obras de teología luterana, de Herrmann, de Harnack, de Ritschl.”1 Thus, Unamuno developed his idea of faith according to a theology that does not condone “the caprice to overlook all that we in religion and Christendom have learned from history.”2 “Porque, después de todo, ¿fe cristiana qué es? O es la confianza en Cristo o no es nada; en la persona histórica y en la histórica revelación de su vida, téngala cada cual como la tuviera.”3 The exemplary image of the historic Christ, the Apostolic Age, the great historic personalities revealed to Unamuno the spiritual possibilities within human nature. They motivated his striving to live an independent spiritual and religious life. “Y si creo en Dios... es, ante todo, porque quiero que Dios exista, y después, porque se me revela, por vía cordial, en el Evangelio, y a través de Cristo y de la historia.”4

History is of value to Unamuno particularly in tracing the essence of Catholicism, that is, of immortality. He pursues the problem of immortality as it developed historically in the essay “La esencia del catolicismo,” and calls the whole evolution of religious thought to his aid. He places the great historic personalities, Christ and Saint Paul, and whole epochs such as Hellenism, Judaism, and the Apostolic Age in the service of his immediate and intimate life with its direct bearing on immortality. In his investigation he makes use, among others, of the following great church historians of his day: Harnack, History of the Dogma; Weizsäcker, The Apostolic Age of the Christian Church; Tröltzsch, The Social Teachings of the Christian Churches; Ritschl, Justification and Redemption; Rohde, Psyche, the Cult of the Soul and the Belief in Immortality among the Greeks; Pfeifferer, The Philosophy of Religion on a Historic Basis. The endeavor of these men is summarized by the English translator of Harnack, Thomas Bailey Saunders, in these words: “They rest their belief on a calm review of the facts of history, and their resolution is the outcome, not of any sectarian prejudice, but of an intelligent desire to promote whatever things are wholesome and true.”5 As a result, Unamuno’s concept of the Christian faith goes beyond mystical individualism like Kierkegaard’s, beyond his purely subjective approach to faith, beyond philosophical and theological speculation, beyond the weight of tradition which supports it. The his-
toric point of view interprets the Christian faith as a living thing.

To such an historic orientation Kierkegaard has this to say: “But faith, in the province of its jurisdiction, raises a still more essential protest against every attempt to approach Christ by the help of what one happens to know of Him through history and the information history has preserved about the consequences of His life. Faith’s contention is that this whole attempt is—blasphemy.” Kierkegaard relied exclusively on his personal religious experiences in matters of faith, on his “own little I,” as he would say. He did not ask for God’s revelations “a través de Cristo y de la historia.” He did not ask for concrete and visible signs of God’s existence here on earth, “en la tierra de los hombres (i.e. in history).” In *Training in Christianity*, the consummation of his critical thought, we read: “Can one learn from history anything about Christ? No. Why not? Because one can ‘know’ nothing at all about ‘Christ’; He is the paradox, the object of faith, existing only for faith. But all historical communication is communication of ‘knowledge,’ hence from history one can learn nothing about Christ. . . . History makes out Christ to be another than He truly is, and so one learns to know a lot about—Christ? No, not about Christ, for about Him nothing can be known, He can only be believed.”

Kierkegaard was driven by an urge to live the Christian faith in its purest form, detached from all earthly connections as one who “quiere buscar la vida eterna fuera de la historia.” He belonged to the few who in Harnack’s description “hear and understand the voice of God, in the secret of their inner personal life.” To be sure, this personal approach to faith was important to Unamuno. But mere intuition, feeling, subjective passion were never strong enough to make him religious. Not until he had studied the historic process of faith at the turn of the century was he convinced of the value of religious faith for life. From that time on he reassures us that the historic process remains the surest way to arrive at the revelation of the basis of life and religion.

The arts also demonstrate Unamuno’s and Kierkegaard’s divergent concepts of reality. On April 15, 1906, Unamuno wrote to his friend Pedro Jiménez Ilundain: “Y lo que hago con más gusto es la poesía,” and again on January 4, 1907, “Hago versos. Es casi lo único que hago desde dentro.” Poetry, next to religion, was the stabilizing element, the great moral force in his life with which he overcame the limitations and shallow effects of rational and materialistic existence. It was the activity through which he concretely expressed his religious consciousness. Like religion, it assumed a lasting cause—truth. “El arte es la suprema verdad, la que se crea en fuerza de fe.” As such it had for him the force of prayer, of being a “profundo ‘Te Deum’ a la madre Naturaleza humanizada.”

Kierkegaard, after an early enthusiasm for art, discovered its meaninglessness and became violently opposed to all forms of aesthetic life, which he regarded as “erotic.” His passion for purity of faith drove him to suppress within himself all feeling for artistic values, and to admit only one alternative: either an aesthetic life or a religious one; either pleasure or suffering. Art meant to him indulgence in pleasure, and he particularly denounced as “a new paganism” efforts to picture Christ. “Would it be possible for me . . . to dip my brush, to lift my chisel, in order to depict Christ . . .? I answer, No, it would be for me an absolute impossibility. . . . It is also inconceivable to me whence the artist derives his calm . . . with which he has sat year in year out industriously labouring to paint a portrait of Christ—without chancing to reflect whether Christ desired perhaps to have a portrait made by his masterbrush . . .”
Thus Kierkegaard attacked Hegel’s philosophy of the fine arts.

On the other hand, Unamuno, who held with Hegel that art is an embodiment of the divine, did not consider his long poem *El Cristo de Velázquez* an unworthy portrait of divinity, a “paganism.” Writing it meant the intensification of the reality of his religious experiences. It was the symbol in his literary work to prove that his religious life took place within the reality of human life itself, not on a sphere apart where Kierkegaard placed religious life. It reflects his basic concept of religion, that purely religious experiences are insufficient for the whole of human reality—“el total Todo,” for they ask for absolute independence from the phenomenal world, from all cultural and social contacts. The whole of cultural life—artistic and intellectual, religious and spiritual—becomes completely immanent existence in Unamuno’s poetry, a concrete self-life, a gradual transformation to the heights of immortality, of “Ser Dios,” as he saw the process reflected in the life of the great poets. “No se me alcanza por qué el Dante, Shakespeare o Cervantes han de ser más intangibles que uno cualquiera de los santos que la Iglesia católica ha elevado a sus altares.”

No such affinity between art and religion is conceivable to Kierkegaard. He tells us in his *Journals* that faith alone can establish a personal relationship to God, that every other medium is a human attribute to faith and as such affects its purity. It is a faith that precludes from the very beginning any positive approach to man’s cultural needs. Purity of faith is possible only if man leaps into the nothing. “Self-annihilation before God” is “man’s truth,” “his highest perfection as human being.” Kierkegaard delighted in extremes and submitted only to the reign of the divine, which in his religion is devoid of all hope for humanity, for morality and civilization. “By faith, Abraham left the land of his fathers and became a stranger in the land of promise. He left one thing behind, took one thing with him: he left his worldly wisdom behind and took faith with him.”

This type of faith is in the truest sense a “tension in the void,” “la pura nada,” the living of “el puro cristianismo” which Unamuno tells us terrified Pascal and to be sure Unamuno himself. “Y he de confesar, en efecto, por dolorosa que la confesión sea, que nunca, en los días de la fe ingenua de mi mocedad, me hicieron temblar las descripciones, por truculentas que fuesen, de las torturas del infierno, y sentí siempre ser la nada mucho más aterradora que él.” We witness the emphatic reversal of past values, notably in the function Unamuno gives to religion, which denies the reality of nothingness and reveals the depth of human nature. He struggles for a richer content of life itself, for the dignity of man in an age in which men like Kierkegaard, Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, and Tolstoi yielded to depression, in which the antimetaphysical philosophy of Häckel, Büchner, Virchow, Vogt dealt a deadly blow to Biblical truth. He violently denounces their philosophy as an intellectualism that encourages the recognition of life’s nothingness. He criticizes nothingness in Leopardi and Senancour, and calls it a “tético pesimismo” in one of his favorite poets, José Asunción Silva. He overlooks Kierkegaard’s nihilistic basis of faith in his concern with actual living reality, “el hombre de carne y hueso, el que nace, sufre y muere.” In direct defiance of the powerful nineteenth century movement favoring life’s nothingness, Unamuno makes life a realm of God: “...hemos creado a Dios para salvar al Universo de la nada.” Nothing less is at stake than “el reino del hombre”—life itself. He calls every man to completeness, to perfection as Jesus and Paul defined it. “Porque la religión no es anhelo de aniquilarse, sino de totalizarse, es anhelo de vida y no de muerte.” Opposite Kierkegaard’s negative view of
life stands Unamuno’s affirmation: “Y sigo creyendo que si creyésemos todos en nuestra salvación de la nada seríamos todos mejores.”

In no respect does Unamuno’s faith clash more decisively with Kierkegaard’s than in the contact it establishes with life. Kierkegaard speaks of faith in absolute terms. Faith to him is a miracle, a passion, an end in itself. It is a service which man renders to God alone. Faith may have been a miracle and a passion to Unamuno; by no means did he consider it an end in itself, a service only to God. “Ni con inventar aquello de la fe en la fe mismas se salía del paso. La fe necesita una materia en que ejercerse.” The “materia” is man himself and the world that surrounds him. “Considera que no hay dentro de Dios más que tú y el mundo.” Unamuno clearly perceives God as an element of the “Yo” and at the same time as an element of the world, “el mundo.” God for him is not something beyond the human sphere, like the traditional or kierkegaardian God. Unamuno incorporates God into a world process, a total goal—“el total Todo.” He submits to the demands of nineteenth-century philosophy and theology which give life meaning and value after centuries of contempt for this world. “No busques, pues, derecha e inmediatamente, fe; busca tu vida, que si te empapas en tu vida, con ella te entrará la fe.” Although Unamuno’s philosophical and theological studies brought with them much complexity and difficulty, we cannot fail to recognize the grandeur of their attempt to make life purposeful. “Cuál es tu religión? Y yo responderé: mi religión es buscar la verdad en la vida y la vida en la verdad.”

The great new concept in Unamuno’s religion is the place of the world in man’s own character and nature. In spite of his intense search after the essence of life which includes the ultimate, God and Eternity, Unamuno believes that man is bound to other men. “Sólo en la sociedad adquieres tu sentido todo, pero despegado de ella.” The recognition of society as part of human reality puts his idea of individuality in direct opposition to Kierkegaard’s, for Kierkegaard denies the value of society. Unamuno seeks a solution of the human problem not by “vía de remoción y exclusión,” but by recognizing the truth in the nineteenth-century trend toward a definition of man’s place in society and in the universe. He shows a determined will to conquer the urge for a self-life in the face of a new and imposing Weltgeist, cleansed of that “individualismo anárquico” which pushes man toward isolation and separation. “Y digo los pueblos y no los individuos aislados, porque si hay sentimiento y concepto colectivo, social, es el de Dios, aunque el individuo lo individualice luego.” The individual—“el hombre de carne y hueso”—no longer remains his own concern. He cannot withdraw into the depth of his “own little I.” He must seek truth in the development of a world-enveloping personality. A complete self-life is impossible without humanity and the universe.

Kierkegaard sought true reality in himself. Hence he defended monastic life as one way to live to the fullest the truth of individual existence. “The mystic renews and revives the last divine image in man. The more he contemplates, the more clearly this image is reflected in him.” Regardless of the fact that Unamuno consumed himself in his struggle with the social, political, and religious conditions of Spain and the world in general, he recognized that a culture based on separation and total isolation from the world is a wholly impossible situation, and he fought the inner urge for isolation by emphasizing the philosophical concepts of unity, totality, and universality as essential life values. With these concepts he combats in En torno al casticismo the separating forces in traditionalism. In the essay “Adentro,” where one would least expect him to
search for a unifying link between the individual and the world, he stresses the mutual contact and intermingling between men, the necessity of association of individuals through the promotion of an inward life that reflects the total truth of human reality—"el yo y el mundo." "Sólo en la sociedad te encontrarás a ti mismo; si te aislas de ella no darás más que con un fantasma de tu verdadero sujeto propio."\textsuperscript{33} Unity and continuity of the life process become essential characteristics of the Man of Flesh and Bone in Del sentimiento trágico. By their means the inner tension produced by life's contradiction is relieved. "Todo lo que en mí conspire a romper la unidad y la continuidad de mi vida, conspire a destruirme..."\textsuperscript{34} Indeed, inward unity and totality are key problems with Unamuno. The isolating forces in Spanish civilization steadily reminded him that the individual must not become separated from his universal reality, and he presents us with an ideal, the Man of Flesh and Bone, the outgrowth of the revolt of nineteenth-century thought against fragmentation, isolation, and separation, against all intellectual chipping of the whole truth, "la verdad verdadera."

Unamuno tried desperately to reconcile his vision of unity between the I and the world with Kierkegaard's isolating attitude. "¿Quién describió la hermosa unión de los hombres más arrebatablemente que quien se quedó solitario en la vida?" dice Kierkegaard, uno de los más grandes solitarios."\textsuperscript{35} Unamuno could not wholly free himself of the inner urge for a self-life as Kierkegaard represents it. He recognized the dignity and value of the great solitary men in history, their originality and universality, their "labor humana" as the individualization of the eternal and universal content—the human spirit. "Los grandes solitarios son, en efecto, los que más han derramado sus espíritus entre los hombres; los más sociales."\textsuperscript{36} But in spite of his deep understanding of Kierkegaard's separating individualism, his essays leave no doubt that the isolated individual, no matter how much he otherwise may represent the world, remains "un átomo," "una abstracción." "No se trata de cielo y de infierno para apuntalar nuestra pobre moral mundana, ni se trata de nada egoísta y personal. No soy yo, es el linaje humano todo el que entra en juego; es la finalidad última de nuestra cultura toda."\textsuperscript{37} He directs his discussions toward the individual, "el hombre Kant," "el hombre Spinoza," "el hombre Butler"; yet all have a common destiny in the human family. All are "hermanos en humanidad." They presuppose a psychological unity between the individual and humanity, a psychological relationship in the totality of human life. "Entregate, pues, a los demás... Mi esfuerzo por imponerme a otro, por ser y vivir yo en él... es lo que da sentido religioso a la colectividad, a la solidaridad humana... necesito adueñarme de la sociedad humana; como soy un producto social, tengo que socializarme... soy yo proyectado al Todo."\textsuperscript{38}

This is intrinsically an ideal of truth and Christianity which completely overshadows Kierkegaard's subjective point of view, the "radically incommunicable in personal existence." Kierkegaard rid himself of all outside interference. He denied categorically man's social consciousness as self-deceit. The idea that it is within the power of the individual to relieve the tension caused by life's contradiction and to achieve a degree of harmony between the opposites, between the I and the world, between the temporal and the eternal order of life, is unthinkable to him. Not even in the remotest sense can the gulf between the opposites be narrowed, least of all closed as Hegel taught and Unamuno believed. Paradox, contrast, disunity, and contradiction make up the content of life for Kierkegaard. He condemned Hegel's concept of unity and totality as unreal, a
fallacy of systematic thought whose ultimate victory is “a road to hell.”

Where then does the point of contact lie between Unamuno and Kierkegaard? On what can we base Unamuno’s deep veneration for Kierkegaard? His essays reveal that he read only two of Kierkegaard’s works: Concluding Unscientific Postscript, to which I counted eight references in Del sentimiento trágico, and Either/Or, which he read late in life. Yet his enthusiasm for Kierkegaard dates back to the year 1900. At that time Unamuno’s attention was drawn to Ibsen’s popularity, and he read Brandes’ criticism of Ibsen’s work. Brandes, following the “Kierkegaard agitation” (Brandes) in the Nordic countries, was eager to bring his countryman Kierkegaard to the attention of the world, and he compared him to the priest Brand, the main character in Ibsen’s popular drama of the same name, making such statements as these: “There is in the priest Brand and in Kierkegaard the same sense of isolation . . . the same will for self-sacrifice and strength of character . . . the same stress on personal sincerity that forces his individualism to an extent . . . the same conviction that in every human being there slumbers the soul of a warrior, an invincible power . . . the same attempt to undermine the authority of the church . . . the same despairing beating of the head against a stone wall.” These were the first impressions Unamuno had of Kierkegaard, and they were lasting.

Unamuno confirms the effect of Brandes’ presentation of Kierkegaard in a revealing statement in the essay “Ibsen y Kierkegaard” (1907) where he says: “Fue el crítico de Ibsen, Brandes, quien me llevó a conocer a Kierkegaard . . .” The implications of this indirect orientation are far-reaching. Unamuno saw Kierkegaard through the eyes of the critic Brandes, the “atheistic church enemy” who held but slight interest in Kierkegaard’s concept of faith, the very key to his writings. Brandes’ failure to place Kierkegaard’s faith in its proper historic perspective leaves the impression that Kierkegaard’s theology is fundamentally that of the priest Brand. It certainly was Unamuno’s impression: “. . . y lo cierto es que en el fondo de la dramaturgia de Ibsen está la teología de Kierkegaard” “. . . y cuanto dure Brand durará Kierkegaard.”

This is a grave error. Ibsen, who was well acquainted with Kierkegaard’s writings, protested the exuberance of the Scandinavian critics who searched among their nationals for his “model.” He was particularly annoyed with Brandes’ comparison of his Brand with Kierkegaard. “Brand is myself in my best moments,” he declared.

Ibsen’s objection is well founded. His Brand represents the idea of faith, initiated in the nineteenth century, which strives for a synthesis of all life values, for a reconciliation of life and faith. “La vida y la fe han de fundirse.” This is a wholly unkierkegaardian concept. Kierkegaard insists that truly religious experiences serve the interests of God alone and not of human life. He feels that Christianity has become the victim of man’s consciousness of this world, and he emphasizes the opposite as fundamental in Christianity, namely, the nothingness of all that is earthly, the idea of self-annihilation.

Clearly Unamuno’s interest could not have been in Kierkegaard the thinker but in Kierkegaard the man, the fighter, the individualist, the non-conformist who fought the evils of this world, who passionately defied all authority, secular as well as religious. In the truest sense of the word, this reactionary yet deeply religious man was a brother to Unamuno in a hostile world that tried to deprive him of his own convictions.

NOTES


6 Kierkegaard, op. cit., “The Obstacle,” sec. B.


Nemesio González Caminero, Professor of Modern Philosophy at the Universidad Pontificia de Comillas (Santander) says in the first volume of his work *Unamuno* (Santander, 1948), pp. 116–117: “La mano de Harnack es tan visible en toda lucubración histórico-eclesiástica de Unamuno, que muchas veces se trata de una mera traducción de las palabras alemanas en castellano. Lo comprueban sus libros de más fondo religioso, como *Del sentimiento trágico de la vida* y *La agonía del cristianismo,* y los ensayos más explícitamente relativos al problema de la fe, que no son, por otra parte, más que avances y primeros diseños de las mismas ideas expuestas después en esos libros mayores y en la *Vida de Don Quijote y Sancho.* En cuestiones como el origen de la fe cristiana en la resurrección de Jesús, la importancia histórica del arriamiento, el significado de ciertos acontecimientos religiosos como el Concilio de Nicaea para la evolución de la fe cristiana, y otros puntos de vista religioso, Unamuno los ha tomado de aquellas lecturas útiles, aunque bien trabajosas, que hacía sobre las obras de Harnack.”


9 Ibid., p. 416.

10 “Esos salmos de mis *Poesías*, con otras varias composiciones que allí hay, son mi religión, y mi religión cantada y no expuesta lógica y razonadamente.” *Mi religión*, p. 14.


12 Kierkegaard, op. cit., p. 248.


14 David F. Swenson, *Something about Kierkegaard* (Minneapolis, 1941), p. 87.


17 Unamuno, *La agonía*, p. 86.


19 Ibid., p. 9.

20 Ibid., p. 130.

21 Ibid., p. 179.

22 Ibid., p. 43.

23 Ibid., p. 155.


25 Ibid., p. 156.


28 Unamuno, *Del sentimiento*, p. 131.

29 Kierkegaard, *Either/Or, a Fragment of Life* (Princeton, 1944), p. 203. The contemplative, monastic life—“la visión beatifica”—is unrealistic to Unamuno. Not in the flight from family and earthly possessions is perfection to be found, but in the common life of mankind.

30 “La moral monástica, la puramente monástica, ¿es un absurdo? Y llamo aquí moral monástica a la del cartujo solitario, a la del eremita, que huye del mundo—llevándolo acaso consigo para vivir solo y a solas con un Dios solo también y solitario” (*Del sentimiento*, pp. 229–230).


32 Unamuno, *Del sentimiento*, p. 16.

33 Unamuno, *Soledad*, p. 49.

34 Ibid.

35 Unamuno, *Del sentimiento*, p. 106. Cf. p. 27: “El hombre, pues, en su estado de individuo aislado, no ve, ni oye, ni toca, ni gusta, ni huele más que lo que necesita para vivir y conservarse. . . . Pero el hombre ni vive solo ni es individuo aislado, sino que es miembro de sociedad, encerrando no poca verdad aquél dicho de que el individuo, como el átomo, es una abstracción.”

36 Unamuno, *Del sentimiento*, p. 224.

37 In 1932, in the preface to “San Manuel Bueno, Mártir,” Unamuno makes this revealing statement: “Precisamente ahora, cuando estoy componiendo este prólogo, he acabado de leer la obra: ‘O lo uno o lo otro’ (Enten-Eller) de mi favorito Soeren Kierkegaard, obra cuya lectura dejé interrumpida hace unos años—antes de mi destierro,” (Feb. 1924).

38 Unamuno wrote on April 3, 1900, to Clarín: “Ahora que traduzco ya el dano-noruego o noro-dañés voy a chapuzarme en el teólogo y pensador Kierkegaard fuente capital de Ibsen, que decía de joven que aspiraba a ser el poeta de Kierkegaard, según he leído en el libro de Brandes sobre Ibsen, que es donde
empecé a aprender danés (tarea facilísima sabiendo alemán e inglés)" (Epistolario, p. 82).


42 Unamuno, Mi religión, p. 51.


44 Unamuno, Mi religión, p. 51.

45 Unamuno, Mi religión, p. 52.


47 Unamuno introduces the essay "La fe" with this quotation from Ibsen's Brand.